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Abstract 
As the use of technology permeates organizations, as well as our personal and professional lives, 
organizational research has aimed to report the incidence of security breaches. However, self-
reporting in survey research is flawed given that organizations are hesitant to admit to loss of 
sensitive data and other security breaches. Furthermore, there are gradients of breaches, rather than 
binomial occurrences, or lack of occurrences. Hence, a more comprehensive and less obtrusive 
measure of the nature and impact of breaches is necessary in order to advance theory and practice. 
As such, we tested a new measure of impact with representatives from over 500 organizations 
intended to measure the extent of a breach and its subsequent impact on the organization. We 
developed the construct using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and report on 
convergent validity. We find the impact of breaches tends to be greater for decentralized 
organizations, smaller organizations, and those within the financial services industry.  
 
Keywords 
IT Security, Impact of Security Breaches, Organizational Impacts, Measurement, Dependent 
Variable 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Security breaches in organizations are a systemic concern in the US and around the globe. Recent 
US governmental policies and public disclosure laws have required companies to report security 
breaches. As such, many studies have reported the occurrence and types of breaches, or, the 
effectiveness of preventative and deterrence measures (Keller et al., 2008, Price-Waterhouse 
Coopers 2008, Richardson 2008 & 2010, Herath & Rao 2009). Others have sought to understand 
the impact of these public announcements and the breaches themselves, such as decreases in 
market value (Goel & Shawky, 2009) and impacts on the stock market (Garg, Curtis & Harper, 
2003). Finally, niche markets have explored how security breaches impact hotel guest perceptions 
(Berezina, Cobanoglu, Miller & Kwansa, 2012) and supply chain performance (Sindhuja, 2014). 
However, the utility of such reporting in academic research (as well as the measures used in extant 
research) is suspect, given that companies are often hesitant to report breaches in a survey research 
format. In fact, the CSI Survey (Richardson, 2008, 2010) reported that many respondents were 
unwilling to report actual incidents, hindering academic research into this area. In fact, Richardson 
states that “fewer respondents than ever are willing to share specific information about the dollar 
 
 
losses they incurred” (2010). Garg and colleagues (2003) highlighted studies showing breaches to 
be anywhere from 36% of companies to 90% of companies experiencing breaches (illustrating 
hesitancy in reporting depending on the surveyor). To further complicate matters, breaches can go 
undetected for some time, as exemplified by the well publicized breach at TJX. (For an in-depth 
case study analysis of this event, the effect on the company, stakeholders, and effects over time, 
see Hovav & Gray, 2014.) 
 
Rather than study the occurrence of breaches or safeguards implemented, the current research 
explores a new measure of the impact that security breaches have on the organization. The severity 
of security breaches is therefore based on the actual degree of impact on the organization and its 
operations, rather than an explicit reporting of the type of breach, or the distal market conditions 
that may surround a public disclosure of a breach (Goel & Shawky, 2009). In fact, some 
researchers would argue that the effect of security incidents on the market value of companies have 
shown mixed results (Hovav & Gray, 2014). As such, we argue, with our new measure, that 
breaches can impact an organization not only through loss of revenue but by damaging its 
reputation, by rendered its systems inoperable, causing lower morale, and wasting the time of its 
personnel. Hence, regardless of the reason for the breach, we argue that the impact is of greater 
importance to advancing theory.  
 
In order to explore the impact of IT security breaches, we adapt an existing set of questions from 
a measure of business crime impact (Elliott, 2008). We tested the construct with data from over 
500 organizations, surveying key informants from the institutions. We developed the construct 
using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and report on convergent validity. First we 
provide a background with regard to the motivation and objectives of the study, a literature review 
that justifies the need for this study, selection of measurement items, and development of our 
hypotheses. Subsequent sections outline the method, analysis, results, and discussion, which 
include the study’s contributions, limitations, and opportunities for future research.  
 
2. Literature Review & Hypothesis Development 
As noted above, the cause and types of security breaches has been studied (or attempts have been 
made); yet there exists a disconnect between our understanding of these breaches and the relevant 
outcomes. The objective of this study was to understand the impact of IT security breaches in 
organizations, both large and small, across a variety of industry sectors. In reviewing the academic 
literature on IT security we were unable to find an existing measure of impact. Therefore, our 
objective is to inform academic research through the development and application of a measure of 
impact. Future research will then better inform theory and practice as to the relationship between 
breaches, preventative measures, and other organizational or institutional factors.  
 
Our research also aims to inform organizational practice and governmental policy by describing 
the differences in impact found across a variety of organizations, such as degree of centralization, 
size of organization, and industry. Executives and policy makers are concerned with the degree to 
which security breaches impact organizations, given the implications in a variety of domains (e.g., 
reputation, profits, consumer confidence, etc.). Thus, the funding for the study was in part provided 
by a grant from the National Institute for Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice. This funding 
enabled us to collect data from a very large sample of over 500 organizations from across the 
United States.  
 
 
 
2.1 Need to Measure the Impact of Security Breaches 
Academic study of IT security has grown recently, as the increasingly ubiquitous use of internet-
related technologies has become critical to the operation of most modern organizations. Yet IS 
academic research in this area is still in its infancy (Zafar & Clark, 2009). As is often the case, the 
focus on the technology related to security has outpaced the focus on management of the 
technology in both academic research, as well as in practice.  
 
As noted earlier, self-report studies that ask organizations to report the nature and occurrence of 
breaches is likely to be flawed. Employees often underestimate the frequency of security breaches 
(Herath & Rao 2009) and organizations have little if no incentive to make security breaches public 
(Zafar & Clark, 2009). One logical reason for not reporting incidents is the fear that public 
disclosure of incidents will impact the reputation of the organization (Cavusoglu et al., 2004). 
While empirical evidence suggests there is a limited overall negative market reaction to public 
announcements, there is a highly significant reaction to certain types of breaches (Campbell, 
Gordon, Loeb & Zhou, 2003), with confidential data having a higher impact on the stock market. 
This pattern of underestimating and/or underreporting the occurrence breaches makes it difficult 
evaluate preventative efforts, as well as management practices that can mitigate the consequences 
of breaches.  
 
Aside from adherence to regulatory rules, overall there are few incentives for organizations to 
report incidents, leaving it difficult for academic studies to assess the design and efficacy of the 
security policies and technologies adopted to prevent or respond to breaches. Hence, while studies 
reporting the frequency of different types of breaches are important to raise awareness, these 
reported occurrences cannot always be considered reliable, nor can they easily be correlated with 
the impact on the organization internally (beyond external public relations). We therefore believe 
that real advances can be achieved by having a measure to assess the severity of the impact of 
incidents. This will enable research to better evaluate the value of different safeguards and to 
understand the effectiveness of policies, procedures and technologies.  
 
2.2 Prior Research on Impact 
Given that there is a lack of research in the area of outcomes (or independent variables) related to 
breaches, we chose to expand our search to other domains. We identified a business crime survey 
(Elliott, 2008) that measured the impact of crime, although some of the items (e.g., moved 
premises, changed layout design) seemed less relevant to our objectives than others. Ultimately 
six of the items were retained and are bolded in the text below, and respondents were asked to 
report on these items on a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 representing “no impact” and 7 representing 
“significant impact”. Our paper proceeds with the rationale for their retention, thus formulating 
the construct proposed in this paper.  
 
First, losses are often incurred during a response to breaches, which results in employees spending 
time that detracts from their overall productivity, resulting in a relative waste of that employee’s 
time. Thus, we determined that the impact construct should include items to measure disruption 
to operations, staff downtime and the impact that a breach may have on lowering company 
moral. 
 
 
 
Second, markets may react to breaches, having an impact on the organization’s relationship with 
its customers. Thus, there is the potential negative implication that a breach could have on revenues 
(Campbell et al., 2003). For example, Amazon experienced a denial of service attack that resulted 
in millions of dollars in lost business. In this instance, the frequency of such attacks is arguably 
less meaningful than the fact that a single significant attack occurred. Therefore we believe that in 
developing a construct for impact we should include an item that measures loss of revenue.  
 
In addition to the impact breaches may have on an organization’s revenue and operations, the 
impact of breaches may also have other financial consequences. As with the single occurrence of 
a breach, organization respondents are often unwilling to report the dollar figure associated with 
an incident. However, secondary costs may not be as sensitive an issue, such as the cost of 
insurance secured to protect the company from losses. Breaches may also be viewed as a risk by 
insurance companies, whose reaction to an incident could be to raise premiums. Therefore the 
impact construct needs to measure increases in insurance costs.  
 
Prior survey research reported that 80% of respondents acknowledged financial losses related to 
computer crimes, although 44% were unwilling to quantify those losses, again reinforcing the 
argument that impact to reputation is a vital concern which translates into an unwillingness for 
managers to readily report on their occurrence (Gordon et al., 2005). Hence, we argue that the 
impact construct should include an item to measure damage to company image.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis development and criterion validity 
As in any effort to thwart criminal activity, it is important to understand and properly assess the 
levels of risk exposure in different areas (Dimopoulos et al., 2004). Prior studies have reported 
differences in the level of investment and efforts undertaken by organizations of different sizes 
and across different industry sectors (Dimopoulos et al., 2004). For example, organization size is 
related to likelihood of conducting a risk assessment (UK National Computing Center 2000). Risk 
assessments are linked to greater acceptance of security measures by employees and help to insure 
compliance (Rees & Allen, 2008). One of the main reasons smaller organizations do not conduct 
risk assessments are fears of disruptions to operations (Federal Aviation Association 2001).  
 
Another reason for differences across organizations is that there are generally greater resources 
and larger IT staffs available in larger organizations (Straub, 1990; Blakely, 2002). The staff in 
smaller organizations may also have less knowledge of security solutions and less knowledge of 
how to approach the issue (Brake, 2002). Management in smaller organizations may also know 
employees well enough to become more trusting. The absence of accepted industry wide measures 
to enable the evaluation of the efforts of smaller and medium organizations may also be responsible 
for fewer assessments being conducted within smaller organizations (Robins, 2001).  
 
Dimopoulos and colleagues published results of a study of small to medium size organizations 
where data was collected in UK and US to evaluate organizational attitudes toward security (2004). 
The study reports that large organizations (greater than 500 FTEs) were 21% more likely to be 
attending to the implementation of security safeguards than smaller organizations. Larger 
organizations have a budget dedicated to security (compared to just 15% of smaller organizations) 
and larger organizations have access to IT security experts.  This lack of expertise may also explain 
why smaller organizations were also less likely to have a documented security policy.  
 
 
  
Kankanhalli et al. (2003) also found that smaller organizations were engaged in fewer efforts 
focused on deterrence of security threats and that the deterrent efforts increased the effectiveness 
of IS security. However, larger organizations have more to lose. It is precisely their vulnerability 
that requires them to invest more heavily in assessments and the development of protocols. This 
may indeed reduce the sheer number of breaches, yet it may not minimize the impact. Hence, we 
hypothesize the following:  
  
H1:  Larger organizations will experience greater impact (damages to reputation, 
disruptions to operations, etc.) from security breaches than smaller organizations.  
 
Industry has received too little attention in information systems research and theory, and research 
has historically focused on too narrow a range of industries (Chiasson & Davidson, 2005). As 
such, we sought to incorporate industry into our model of interpreting how industry sector is related 
to security breaches. For example, the concern for security breaches is greater among organizations 
in the financial sector, due to the large potential impact that a breach could have on them (Goodhue 
& Straub, 1991). As such, it is logical that organizations in the financial sectors invest more in 
deterrent efforts (Kankanhalli, et al., 2003). Kankanhalli and colleagues also found that 
organizations in non-financial industry sectors invested less in deterrent efforts and subsequently 
were less effective at IS security. Organizations will experience greater impact, particularly when 
the types of breaches are more likely to be associated with sensitive data. That is, some industry 
sectors will also have a greater concern for IS security due to the impact it could have on their 
reputation (Goodhue & Straub, 1991). We therefore hypothesize that financial services, while they 
may indeed invest more in security initiatives, it is for good reason: financial services industry 
participants will report greater impact from security breaches. 
  
H2: Organizations in financial services industries will report greater impact from security 
breaches than non-financial services industry companies. 
 
A great deal of prior research on IT organizational structure does exist, much of it focusing on the 
question of centralizing or decentralizing the IT function within an organization (King 1983, 
Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999). This approach informs questions of how best to manage the locus 
of decision-making and associated governance of IT (Brown and Magill 1994, 1998; and 
Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999). The structural approach also informs how organizations can 
manage the complex integration of systems, including their protection from breaches and 
organization of responses to incidents. To date, little research has documented how such structures 
might result in lowering or increasing the impact of security breaches.  
 
The choice of management structures can ultimately hold implications for managing IT, given the 
increased complexity involved in the coordination, implementation and maintenance of security 
policies, technologies, and response plans and procedures that occur with greater decentralization. 
Thus, the benefits associated with greater centralization of structures should decrease the 
organization’s impact from security breach incidents. 
 
H3: Centralized organizations will experience lower impact than decentralized 
organization. 
 
 
 
 
3. Method 
 
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
Development of the impact construct was conducted as a part of a larger study of the state of IT 
security. Our approach to investigating the state of IT security was to conduct both local and 
nation-wide online surveys. Initial surveys were pre-tested with local and regional key constituents 
of the university; however, the majority of the survey data were collected from individuals in over 
500 organizations using existing survey panel members solicited through a research vendor. The 
panel was screened to identify lists of participants who fit a number of requirements, including a 
mix of demographics such as region, industry, etc. Next, their participation was requested through 
an email invitation. In order to insure that our participants were qualified to respond to the 
questions in the survey we used several forms of screening and validation. First, the survey panel 
was mined for respondents who were decision makers, had knowledge of IT and were managers 
in their organizations. Secondly, we asked respondents a series of screener questions about 
requisite knowledge of information technology and security issues within their company (e.g., 
policies, procedures, and management of IT). Third, we examined the survey responses (after data 
was collected) to insure that each screener response was reasonable given the size, industry and 
title of respondent. The sample analyzed in this report consists of 556 responses in a wide range 
of industries across the country. However, sample sizes vary based on the analysis (as noted below) 
and based on completeness of the data for a particular variable.  
 
3.2 Analysis 
We split the data randomly into two sets: one for exploratory factory analysis and the other for 
confirmatory analysis. AMOS 21 was used for the confirmatory analysis on the factor – policy 
assimilation and SPSS 22 was used to perform the hypotheses testing. Table 1 shows the frequency 
distribution of responses by industry.  
 
Industry Percent 
Financial Services (Banking, Investment Serv., Insurance) 11.09% 
Manufacturing (Mfg., Phara. /Chemical, Transport. /Distrib.) 17.14% 
Education 10.08% 
Professional Services (Consulting) 9.88% 
Government 6.45% 
Healthcare 9.27% 
IT Products & Services (Software, Technology, Telecomm.) 11.29% 
Retail and Real Estate (Property & Construction) 10.48% 
Non-Profit Organizations 5.24% 
Table 1: Distribution by Industry 
 
Table 2 shows the exploratory factor analysis (n=232) with varimax rotation. The results show that 
the KMO is 0.88. The KMO measures the sampling adequacy which should be greater than 0.6 for 
a satisfactory factor analysis to proceed. Large values for the KMO measure indicate that a factor 
analysis of the variables is suitable. Two factors clearly emerge and items load on the construct 
they are supposed to load. The loadings in table 2 are in the range of 0.81 and 0.92, greater than 
 
 
the suggested value of 0.5 (Straub, 1989).  
 
Impact Measure  Mean Std. Deviation Loadings 
Staff down-time 3.63 1.93 0.83 
Disrupted operations 3.78 2.00 0.85 
Lowered staff morale 3.29 2.05 0.92 
Increased insurance costs 3.12 2.08 0.91 
Lost business 3.10 2.09 0.92 
Damaged company image 3.16 2.09 0.90 
Table 2: Factor Loadings and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Reliability/internal consistency measures the degree that the measurement items that reflect the 
same latent variable are in agreement with one another (Churchill, 1979). The most widely used 
internal consistency reliability coefficient is Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1971). Some 
suggest the acceptance level for coefficient alpha should be at least 0.7 (Robinson et al., 1991). 
Our SPSS analysis shows that the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.95 for impact. 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the items of impact. When assessing the measurement 
model for impact, CFI=0.95, GFI =0.91 and AGFI=0.88 fit statistics were used. These indices 
indicate good model fit and provide evidence of both convergent validity and unidimensionality 
(Gerbing & Anderson, 1988; Bagozzi et al., 1991). In addition, as shown in Table 2 high and 
significant factor loadings provides further evidence of convergent validity. Table 3 shows the 
mean score of impact based on company size. As shown the company size with 500 or more has 
the highest mean of impact. 
 
 
Company Size N Mean Std. Deviation 
Under 100 114 3.01 1.75 
100 to 249 88 3.08 1.75 
250 to 499 78 3.24 1.78 
500 or More 173 3.92 1.76 
Table 3: The Mean of Impact Based on Company size 
 
Table 4 below shows that the results of ANOVA analysis. As shown, large companies (500 or 
more) are significantly different from the other three groups (under 100, 100-249, 250-499), 
supporting Hypothesis 1. 
 
 (I) Company Size (J) Company Size Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
500 or More Under 100 .90741* 0.21 0 
100 to 249 .83664* 0.23 0 
250 to 499 .67260* 0.24 0.03 
Table 4:  ANOVA Results on Company Size 
 
Table 5 shows the means of impact score based on different industries. The mean of financial 
services is the third highest. In partial support of Hypothesis 2, Table 6 shows that the mean score 
of impact for the financial services industry is only significantly different for three of the eight 
 
 
other industry groups: professional services, government and non-profit organizations.  
 
Industry N Mean Std. Deviation 
IT Products & Services (Software, Technology, Telecomm.) 56 4.11 1.73 
Education 50 4.01 1.82 
Financial Services (Banking, Investment Serv., Insurance) 55 3.95 1.73 
Healthcare 46 3.64 1.97 
Manufacturing (Mfg., Phara. /Chemical, Transport. /Distrib.) 85 3.39 1.77 
Retail and Real Estate (Property & Construction) 52 3.00 1.74 
Professional Services (Consulting) 49 2.76 1.57 
Government 32 2.53 1.49 
Non-Profit Organizations 26 2.48 1.51 
Table 5: The Means of Impact Based on Industry Category 
 
Industry  Industry Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Financial Services (Banking, 
Investment Serv., Insurance) 
Professional Services 
(Consulting) 
1.19490* .32 .01 
  Government 1.41875* .35 .00 
 Non-Profit Organizations 1.46923* .38 .01 
Table 6. ANOVA Results of Impact on Industry Category 
 
IT organization structure was measured using a scale variable ranging 1 through 9 with 1 indicating 
very centralized and 9 referring to very decentralized. To test H3, we split data into two categories: 
centralized and decentralized. To examine if there is a significant difference on impact between 
centralized and decentralized IT organization structure, t test was performed and Table 7 below 
shows the result. The centralized IT structure has a mean of 2.61 on impact and the decentralized 
organization has a mean of 3.30. The difference on impact between IT organization structure is 
significant at 1% level 
 
Degree of Centralization (1-9) Mean Split Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean  
Centralized 2.61 1.78 0.18 P=1% 
Decentralized 3.30 1.71 0.59 
Table 7: t Test between centralized and decentralized 
 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The motivation and objective of this paper was to establish a measure of the impact of security 
breaches and to assess differences in the impact experienced across organizations of different sizes, 
different industries, and the degree to which they are centralized or decentralized. Although 
organizational research has tested the incidence of breaches, experts agree that this method of 
analyzing outcomes is flawed such that organizations are hesitant to admit to breaches, particularly 
when the types of breaches include loss of sensitive data. A more comprehensive and less sensitive 
outcome measure is necessary in order to advance theory and practice. Therefore, based on prior 
research, we hypothesized that the impact of breaches will be greater for larger organizations, 
decentralized, and those within the financial services industry. Although larger organizations and 
those in financial services may indeed have more resources to dedicate to IT security, they also 
 
 
have the most to lose. As expected, centralized organizations may have a better control over the 
management practices and protocols, hence experiencing lower impact from breaches.  
 
Interestingly, financial services organizations have significantly different means compared to non-
profits and professional service organizations. One explanation is perhaps that these institutions 
are not as desirable of a target to those who may wish to breach IT systems. An alternative 
explanation is that the latter lack the resources to adequately monitor and determine risk, and are 
subsequently unaware of the potential harm that may be caused to their operations, reputation, and 
insurance costs. Alternatively, government organizations are required to have policies and 
procedures, which should include monitoring of their systems. It may be that the representatives 
of these organizations in our sample set do not believe that breaches will impact them in the same 
manner—e.g., reputation is not as proximal a concept to government agencies, and insurance costs 
are not relevant.  
 
Financial services industries have similar mean impact scores relative to health care, IT related 
services industries, and education. Considering the nature of the information maintained by 
educators and health care institutions, this finding makes intuitive sense. And, IT organizations 
clearly have insights into the magnitude of potential impacts. However, future research should 
explore the “why” of these phenomena, helping to inform the reasons for these similarities and 
differences in the data. For example, research has shown that learning over time can help to 
mitigate risk over time (Slayton, 2015), and, top management participation and organizational 
culture play key roles in encouraging employee compliance in information security policies (Hu, 
Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012).   
 
Our research, despite its contributions, is not without limitations. Our data is collected primarily 
via a panel of participants, not a random national sample. Furthermore, items to develop our 
measure were drawn from existing measures, based on theory and prior empirical evidence, not 
derived from grounded theory. Our initial analysis in this study relies on relatively simple statistics, 
and more sophisticated analysis is required. In our efforts to provide a new measure of impact, we 
were unable to provide predictive validity nor criterion related validity of other concepts as it 
related to antecedents. For example, variables that measure investment in safeguards, availability 
of resources, and organizational commitment to security efforts would be expected to predict 
degree of impact.  
 
Future research is necessary to expand upon this analysis. Further testing of this measure will 
enable researchers to test relationships with antecedent variables such as specific security breaches, 
specific safeguards, or the implementation of a variety of management policies. Researcher should 
consider models and relationships controlling for the variables identified in this analysis. An 
established measure of the impact of breaches can also enable analysis of a breach’s relationship 
to short-term or long-term performance of a firm or to the initiation of future actions the 
organization may undertake. In this way, we contribute to the theories developing in the field of 
IS security research.  
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